Philosophy Communication Barriers Essay Example for Free

Philosophy Communication Barriers Essay (a) How does James think of my intending to say something? Does he think of it as a process in consciousness? James argues that our phrasing â€Å"intended to say† is an almost wrong explanation on a subconscious or even psychic thing that it happening within our minds.   The point is that we never consciously form the words in our minds or even draw upon our memory banks to call to mind images of the thing that we mean to say. Instead, it is an unconscious function of the mind that we hear something and choose to respond to it with some form of language. In the event that the language we choose is wrong, we often react with the phrase. â€Å"What I meant to say was†¦Ã¢â‚¬  James argues that this happens when the precognition of our own mind fails to work rapidly enough to anticipate the reaction of the person we are speaking to and choose the proper words to convey to a thought stream to that specific person. On the most basic level, it means that our minds did not act quickly enough to substitute the proper word into a sentence. For example, imagine talking to your best friend about her sister. The intended sentence would be, â€Å"How’s she doing?† As the speaker you would not have planned out the conversation or thought specifically about what to ask, but when you speak and say, â€Å"How’s he doing?† the immediate response is to say, ‘I meant she. How’s she doing?’ there is never a point at which the conscious mind stops and chooses the words to use. This might therefore make an interesting discussion for linguists and psychologists to determine how speech actually happens. James argues that it is a subconscious thing, which implies then that speech is a learned ability you can train the subconscious mind. Take for example learning to speak another language fluently.   Teachers argue that you cannot speak another language fluently until you can think in that language. The premise is basically the same as what James has argues. If you are completely fluent in the language and someone asks,   â€Å"Que es el nombre del gato?† You will be responding with the cat’s name before the image of the cat is even called to mind. If you are less than fluent, you will need to translate the question before you can answer, thus moving the response from the subconscious speech centers to the conscious mind. [(b) Can the arguments Wittgenstein employs against the idea that understanding words is a conscious process be adapted to show that intending or meaning to say words is not a conscious process that begins before I say them   Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚  Ã‚   Wittgenstein argues that the meaning of a word is defined as we use it, not by some memory flash card system begun when we are children.   This then would explain in English the tendency to crease euphemisms and phrases which cannot be translated literally based on the presumed meaning of the individual world. To use his argument, if language were a conscious thing, human speech patterns would always be precise and would never relay on simile, metaphor or any other form of literary device. Instead, in essence, he is arguing that because language to create imagery that is not a specific reflection of the exact meaning of what is said, it is a subconscious action. Likewise then, if the use of language is subconscious and not dependent on a specific meaning when a word is chosen, Wittgenstein’s argument can easily be developed to explain that the use of words or even the development of an answer is not necessarily a conscious thing. Think of it as a sort of language autopilot. Our subconscious mind understands what is being discussed and how to respond to it before the conscious mind has a chance to understand the nature of the question. Therefore, the subconscious mind can formulate a response and begin it before the conscious mind starts to speak. In the event that the conscious mind disrupts the process and inserts its own words, the subconscious mind can send it a message that says, ‘What I meant to say was†¦.† c) James claims that intending to say something is or provides an anticipation or premonition (=knowledge in advance) of the words I will say or think. Do Wittgenstein’s remarks in section. 187-192 show that James is laboring under some misunderstanding about this? Explain. Wittgenstein’s remarks indicate that James is misunderstanding the functioning of the mind by calling the natural process of communication between the conscious and subconscious premonition. He would argue that the act of speech is a sort of subconscious act, with only specific forms of speech coming from the conscious mind. If both parts of the mind are working in proper harmony, the subconscious can formulate and plan a response long before the conscious mind can even think about it. However, this is not a self-premonition or anything as supernatural as James might be implying. Instead, it is a factor of the understanding of the human brain and how it works. Since the body cannot, by definition, understand the workings of the subconscious, we simply must accept that these incidences occur when the subconscious works more rapidly than the conscious mind.   Wittgenstein argues that this is not a premonition, but simply evidence that the mind works much faster than we appreciate. 2.) P. F. Strawson writes: States or experiences†¦owe their identity as particulars to the identity of the person whose states and experiences they are. From this it follows immediately that if they can be identified as particular states and experiences at all, they must be possessed†¦in such a way that it is logically impossible that a particular state or experience in fact possessed by someone should have been possessed by anyone else. The requirements of identity rule out logical transferability of ownership. [Individuals, p. 97] (a) Briefly describe Wittgenstein’s treatment of the idea that â€Å"another person can’t have my pains† in Philosophical Investigations Section 253. (Describe the aims and strategy of his remarks.)[ Wittgenstein disagrees with Strawson, with a tongue-in-cheek sarcasm to illustrate that in the event of Siamese twins, two people could share the exact same pain. Ultimately, though his goal is to demonstrate that identity is not as important to the identification of pain as far as location and intensity. Whether a person has the exact same headache that you are having is not nearly as relevant as the fact that they have had a headache in the past and can therefore commiserate with the pain that you are feeling.   In essence, he is arguing that the sameness of the pain is also irrelevant. When discussing the human condition, it is more important to draw parallels between like circumstances than to throw up semi-rational boundaries such as the identifiers that Strawson used. While it may technically, maybe, be impossible for more than one other person to feel the exact same pain that you are feeling, in the human nature of inexact speech we often use the phrase â€Å"same pain† to indicate that we have been in similar circumstances. Drawing unnecessary barriers by pointing out that our individuality will affect the way that we feel pain does nothing to promote a greater understanding of pain, the nature of the individual, the nature of empathy or the human condition. If Strawson were attempting to define the uniqueness of the individual, his commentary might have been relevant, but in a discussion about the nature of pain, it is divisive and irrelevant. The point is to discuss the sameness of the human condition in that while we may have different understandings of pain, we can interrelate via the concept of pain. For example, two women with menstrual cramps may not be experiencing the same intensity of pain or even the same location, but they can relate based on the similar circumstance. (b) Do observations like those in his PhilosophicalRemarks *2 account for all the ways we use the expression (same) pain?] Wittgenstein’s examples via Philosophical Remarks perhaps do not go far enough in disavowing Strawson’s claims, but he does make a good start. By arguing that the criteria of identifying the sameness of pain involves location and intensity as criteria rather than identity of the person feeling the pain, Wittgenstein effectively argues that Strawson’s claim is false. What he fails to discuss are the non-physical sources of pain and whether they can be the same pain or if Strawson is closer to the mark when using inaccurate language to describe emotional trauma. But here too, if Wittgenstein had desired, he could argue that Strawson’s claim is fundamentally flawed. Again, we go first to the example of identical twins that are raised together. Though there might be some differences in their emotional makeup, for the most part, they are going to feel emotional pain in the same way. But even if we forgo the genetic aspect ad simply discuss emotion as an end result of experience, it seems ludicrous to assume that each of the six billion people on the planet will have experienced life in a completely unique way and will therefore never have the same pain as another person. (c) Push Wittgenstein’s investigation one step further. We say things like this: â€Å"I had two bad headaches today: one in the morning and one in the afternoon†. What are â€Å"criteria† for sameness and difference in such cases? The primary criteria for sameness and difference in this case would be the location of the headache and its intensity. For example, a tension headache might begin at the base of the spine and radiate upward, a sinus headache might begin just below the eyes and a migraine might be a throbbing in the temples. Each can be described as a bad headache depending on the severity and each is unique in its location. However, often people who are prone to headaches will have them in the same location and are given to saying, â€Å"I had that same headache again† to indicate to the listeners that this is a recurring problem in the same location with the same intensity. When language is used precisely, this is an inexact statement, but if the primary purpose of language is to convey meaning to the listener, this can be a much simpler way of saying â€Å"I have a headache again in the same spot as I did yesterday and it hurts the same amount.† Much like with the other discussion, Wittgenstein seems to be challenging his fellow philosophers regarding their choice and use of the language. Because the language itself is inexact, making a claim simply based on the language usage is invalid. (d) Do these cases vindicate Strawson? I do not believe these issues vindicate Strawson at all. It appears that he was doing exact what Wittgenstein was trying to warn against: he was using an imprecise example of language to erect a barrier to human empathy that need not exist. Generally speaking, when a person uses the phrases, â€Å"I feel your pain† it is to indicate that I have been in a similar circumstance and have felt pain because of it. As such, I can empathize with your pain. However, people simply do not talk that way and to expect them to do so is illogical. Therefore, Wittgenstein rebukes Strawson, fairly gently, trying to make him understand that the same is not always the same.   It makes perfect sense when you consider the propensity in English to use the phrase â€Å"exactly the same†. Though sameness implies that two things are alike, we have learned to differentiate between things that are similar and thus the same in casual conversation and things that are identical.